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This Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) of the BIPS-GDS is a tabular siommary of 
hazards and undesired events which may lead to system damage or failure and/or hazard 
to personnel. The PHA reviews the CDS as it is envisioned to operate in the Vacuum Test 
Chamber (VTC) of the CDS Test Facility. The VTC and other equipment which will comprise 
the test facility are presently in an early stage of preliminary design and will undoubt-
edly undergo numerous changes before the design is frozen. This PHA and the FMECA to 
follow are intended to aid the design effort by identifying areas of concern which are 
critical to the safety and reliability of the BIPS-GDS and test facility. 
A PHA was previously prepared on the BIPS-FS (Ref. AIRPHX Report 75-311629 dated 
October 31, 1975). Many hazards/undesired events identified therein also apply to the CDS, 
but have generally not been repeated. For example, possible contamination of the working 
fluid by offgassing of alternator organic material is of concern during operation of the 
CDS, but has not been repeated herein because the problem will be adequately treated during 
development of the Mini-BRU. On the other hand, contamination of the working fluid through 
the presence of residual contaminants is repeated since charging of the system with "pure" 
working fluid gases will be an important step in preparing the CDS for operation. 
The PHA uses the following symbols to identify the "Program Phase" of interest: 
PRE - CDS preparation; Pre-Startup of BIPS 
GOP - GDS-BIPS Operating 
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The following symbols have been used under the heading "Hazard Category" to denote 
the potential result of the identified hazard/undesired event. They are the same symbols 
used in the PHA of the IBFS and are consistent with the hazard level defined and estab-
lished by MIL-STD-882, "Requirements for System Safety Program for Systems and Associated 
Subsystems and Equipment." Each hazard category is equated not only to system damage, but 
to personnel injury as well. However, with the BIPS-GDS (and to a lesser extent with the 
BIPS-FS) most hazards are related to system damage or failure. (The first column under 
"Hazard Category" denotes the estimated severity before "Corrective Action/Minimizing Pro-
visions" have been identified; the second column indicates the estimated potential for 
eliminating or minimizing the effects). 
I - Negligible - will not result in personnel injury or system damage 
II - Marginal - can be counteracted or controlled without injury to personnel 
or major system damage 
III - Critical - will cause personnel injury or major system damage, or will re-
quire immediate corrective action for personnel or system survival 
IV - Catastrophic - will cause death or severe injury to personnel or system loss 
(It should be noted that personnel hazards associated with the BIPS-GDS are virtually 
non-existent, assuming that normal caution is exercised in working with the equipment 
comprising the system and its test facility). 
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A number of possible undesired events which will result in shutdown of the BIPS-
GDS have been categorized as "II - Marginal" since major system damage will not occur. 
However, these unscheduled shutdowns are highly undesirable and all economically feasible 
precautions must be taken to preclude these interruptions during performance and 
endurance tests. 
Comments and suggested changes and additions should be forwarded to AiResearch 
Manufacturing Company of Arizona, attention; L.G. Miller, P.O. Box 5217, Phoenix, 
Arizona 85010. 
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High quality Xe/He 
required as working 
fluid; required chem 
analysis as part of 
QA acceptance; use 
getter in fill line; 
re-use acceptably 
"clean" bottles and 
keep above minimum 
pressure. 
Cleaning procedures 
for pre-storage and 
post-assembly of 
components must be 
developed to elimin-
ate levels of con-
taminants determined 
to be harmful to C-
103. 
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(1500°C, '\̂36 hrs. 
<3 X 10-4 torr); 
reassemble, store in 
inert atmosphere. 
load HSA in inert at-
mosphere, seal. 
Consider using super 
alloy turbine plenum 
and ducting for GDS; 
substitute a simple 
heat source simulato 
for HSA/EHS. Pro-
vide cladding for 
EHS - Pt 3008 or 
silicide coated C-
103 "can". 
Provide cleaning and 
decontamination of 
components; pump 
down and bake out 
vacuiom chamber after 
GDS is installed but 
prior to start up. 
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GOP Sublimation of 
braze material 
used to attach 
internal fins 













braze material must 
be carefully selec-
ted. 
Install fast acting 
gate valves to seal 
pump inlets (auto-
matically triggered 
by loss of pump, 
vacu\im, or facility 
power); use redun-
dant gate valves 
located between pump 
inlets and vacuiom 
chamber interface. 
(Turbo-molecular 
pump discharges to 
roughing pump which 
discharges to at-
mosphere) ; shroud 
pump discharges in 




occur prior to valve 
actuation. 
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lows, as a re-






















CORRECTIVE ACTION/ 1 
MINIMIZING PR0VISI0N3 
Achieve smooth, 1 
polished interior 1 
surface; clean sur- 1 
face with appropri- 1 
ate solvents. 
(Caution - Use of 
solvents introduces 
health hazards. 
Wear mask - and dan-
ger of explosion -
use extreme care). 
Close QA control is 
necessary to assure 
quality of welds and 
ducts. 
Double containment 
weld joints should 
be considered where 
feasible. 
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Correct design of 
bellows to compen- 1 
sate for centerline 1 
misalignment due to 
thermal expansion 
and lateral deflec-
tion will be an ab-
solute necessity, as 
is the development 
and demonstration of 
highly reliable bi-
metallic joints 
(C-103 to Hast-X) 
Assure proper align-
ment of components 
at time of assembly 
of GDS; perform 
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ual gas analyzer 
(similar to a mass 
spectrometer) to the 
vacuum test chamber 
can serve to warn of 
leaks in GDS by 
detecting xenon and 
helium from working 
fluid. (The RGA can 
also identify source 
of other leaks or 
vacuum test chamber 
introduced contamin-
ants such as argon 




roughing pumps, and 
miscellaneous out-
gassing) . 
Consider use of hot 
getters inside tank 
near seals and pene-
trations. 
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Leakage of GDS 
working fluid 
(Contd) 







Leak at duct/ 
manifold inter 





braze; leak in 
copper duct of 
































QA control should 1 
preclude; proof I 
pressure test should! 
detect. 1 




up batteries, vice 
commercial power. 
Provide emergency 
system designed to 
automatically close 
gate valves sealing 
pump inlet ports; 
introduce positive 
pressure ('̂'l.l 
atmos.) argon into 
tank to protect C-
10 3 in GDS if vacuum 
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15 Vacuum pump 
failure 
loss is sufficient 




molecular pumps (two 
minimum, operating 
in parallel; con-
sider third pump in 
standby; single p\imp 
capable of sustain-
ing 10-5 torr, once 
attained). Incorpo-
rate sensors which 
will close gate 
valves on pump inlet 
in event of individ-
ual pump failure, 
thereby protecting 
vacuum chamber from 
intake of contamin-
ants. 
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the-art high vacuum 
technology should 
preclude leakage of 
magnitude sufficient 
to seriously affect 
chamber environment. 
(Conceptual protec-
tion system will 
sense loss of vacuum 
and take measures to 
protect system from 
damage). 
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speed has been 
calculated to 
be 105,000 rpm 














Proper design of 1 
controls should pre-J 
elude. Close qual- 1 
ity control neces- 1 
sary to preclude 
failures which could 
result in overspeed 
condition (e.g., 
loss of electrical 
and/or parasitic 
load(s)). (Prelim-
inary design of test 
facility includes 
turbine bypass valve 
system intended to 
automatically open j 
and shut down -engine 
if overspeed condi-
tion is present. 
thus affording sys-
tem protection). 
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Design and quality 
control must assure 
the integrity of the 
working fluid loop 
containment. 
(Preliminary design 
of test facility in-
cludes turbine by-
pass valve system 
intended to auto-
matically open and 
shut down engine if 
underpressure of 
foil bearings condi-




of test facility in-
cludes, as a safety 
feature, a pressure 
relief valve between 
Mini-BRU compressor 
outlet and recuper-
ator H.P. inlet. 
Consider use of aud-
ible and/or visual 
signal to warn of 
pressure exceeding 
i nnminfll limit.. 
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shutdowns) to alert/ 
warn/shutdown system 
when these condi-
tions are encoun^ 
tered. (Preliminary 
design of test fa-
cility includes tur-
bine bypass valve 
system intended to 
automatically open 
and shut down engine 
if overtemperature 
condition is detec-
ted at compressor 
inlet, turbine 
inlet, foil bearings 
or alternator, thus 
affording system 
protection). 
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ing in gradual 
or rapid fail-




















er selection of 





clude; minimal areas 




dant pumps (two in 






system which would 
introduce water at 
tap pressure into 
cooling coils for 
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during repair and/ 





possible causes for 
failure; FMECAs will 
identify failure 
modes and effects. 
Consider the use of 
dedicated power gen-
erators with redun-
dancy and/or back-up 
batteries, vice com-
mercial power, for 
all ancillary equip-
ment, EHS, control 
system, and monitor-
ing equipment. 
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Protection system is 
sensitive to valve 
failure (electrical 
or mechanical), to 
momentary power 
interruptions, and 
to open circuits in 
circuit which holds 
valve closed. 
Consider redundant 
valves in bypass 
duct to preclude 
single valve failure 
shutting down system 
Consider use of 
normally closed 
valves with backup 
power supply for 
opening when shut 
down system is 
activated. 
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down of GDS 
(continued) 




















1-Journal Brg Low Pre|s, 
1-Thrust Brg. " ' 
1-Loss of vacuum in 
Test Chamber. 
The manner of connecting the sensing system 
has yet to be determined. Care must be taken 
in circuit design to preclude single errone-
ous signals and malfunctioning sensors, trans 
ducers, comparators from shutting down system 
during test runs. For example, system may 
require "majority vote" (overspeed signals 
from at least 2 of 3 speed sensors) to shut 
down engine. Reliable design coupled with 
quality materials and assembly will be requir 
ed to preclude false alarms and shutdowns. 
